As another Lame Cherry exclusive in matter anti matter.
The nuclear first strike ability of the United States.
If you desire to understand why Donald Trump keeps cocking off to nuclear armed nations, the following is a glimpse of what HR McMasters and Mad Dog Mattis have been whisper to Donald Trump and Rex Tillerson, so they think they are the alpha nuclear males to piss on the other dogs.
The Lame Cherry never just republishes information found online, but instead expands the concept beyond the egg heads to the mechanics of systems in teaching how a machine works.
For example in your first lesson, the United States nuclear warheads are 3 times more accurate than the Russians. That factors out that the Russians know this, and will factor in in launching 3 missiles to carpet bomb a target, thereby instead of one 800 kiloton nuclear warhead at ground zero, there will be 2400 kilotons of nuclear energy in 3 times the radioactivity.
In Russian strategy, their overload of "excess" missiles factors in American missile shield and Russian lack of accuracy, meaning that from every Russian border, there will be missiles shot down, scattering armed warheads not on targets, but in all the territories from Kiev to London, to Vladivostok to Minot. Meaning Canada and the Netherlands for example.
With that let us begin with Donald Trump's thinking hydrogen bombs. These bombs are more accurate due to a super fuse, which allows them to accurately pinpoint warheads to destroy hard target missile silos in Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
The experts can explain the always expert details.
The super-fuze is designed to measure its altitude well before it arrives near the target and while it is still outside the atmosphere. This measurement would typically be taken at an altitude of 60 to 80 kilometers, where the effects of atmospheric drag are very small. At this point, the intended trajectory is known to very high precision before the warhead begins to substantially slow from atmospheric drag. If the warhead altitude measured by the super-fuze at that time were exactly equal to the altitude expected for the intended trajectory, the warhead would be exactly on target. But if the altitude were higher than expected, the warhead could be expected to hit beyond the intended aim point. Likewise, if the altitude is lower than that expected, the warhead would likely hit short of the intended aim point.
Testing has established the statistical shape and orientation of the expected spread of warhead locations as they fly towards the target. In the case of Trident II, the spread of trajectories around the intended trajectory is so small that the best way to increase the chances of detonating inside the lethal volume is to intentionally shift the aim point slightly beyond the location of the target. (Note that the intended trajectory in Figure 3 is shifted slightly down range.)
By shifting the aim point down range by a distance roughly equal to a CEP, warheads that would otherwise fall short or long of the target using the conventional Mk4 fuze instead will detonate—at different heights dictated by the super fuze—within the lethal volume above a target. This shift in the down-range aim point will result in a very high percentage of warheads that overfly the target detonating in the lethal volume. The end result is that with the new Mk4A super-fuze, a substantially higher percentage of launched warheads detonate inside the lethal volume, resulting in a considerable increase in the likelihood that the target is destroyed.
So now America has accurate thermonuclear warheads, but what will they use it for, and more to the point what can the US arsenal now be designed to a victorious first strike.
The US military assumes that Russian SS-18 and TOPOL missile silos are hardened to withstand a pressure of 10,000 pounds per square inch or more. Since with the new super-fuze, the probability of kill against these silos is near 0.9, the entire force of 100-kt W76-1/Mk4A Trident II warheads now “qualifies” for use against the hardest of Russian silos. This, in turn, means that essentially all of the higher-yield nuclear weapons (such as the W88/Mk5) that were formerly assigned to these Russian hard targets can now be focused on other, more demanding missions, including attacks against deeply-buried underground command facilities. In effect, the significant increase in the killing power of the W76 warhead allows the United States to use its submarine-based weapons more decisively in a wider range of missions than was the case before the introduction of this fuze.
The Americans were quite jdam brilliant really. They put fins on obsolete iron bombs to make them guided missiles making carpet bombing archaic, and now have made super weapons of the super weapons.
The history of the US super-fuze program. The super-fuze is officially known as the arming, fuzing and firing (AF&F) system. It consists of a fuze, an arming subsystem (which includes the radar), a firing subsystem, and a thermal battery that powers the system. The AF&F is located in the tip of the cone-shaped reentry body above the nuclear explosive package itself. The AF&F developed for the new W76-1/Mk4A is known as MC4700 and forms part of the W76 life-extension program intended to extend the service life of the W76—the most numerous warhead in the US stockpile—out to the time period 2040-2050.
The new super-fuze uses a technology first deployed on the high-yield W88/Mk5 Trident II warhead. The Navy’s Strategic Systems Program contracted with the Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation in the early 1980s to develop a new fuze that included “a radar-updated, path-length compensating fuze … that could adjust for trajectory errors and significantly improve the ability to destroy a target. This was an early and sophisticated use of artificial intelligence in a weapon.”
It is possible to "auger" it in. Meaning, with accurate nuclear missiles and effective warheads, it is possible to place a series of nuclear warheads into the same bulls eye, and literally dig down a 350 yard crater. 5 standard United State's warheads on target could "dig" a 300 yard wide trench, 1 mile down to an underground bunker city complex and obliterate the entire command center.
That is a Lame Cherry exclusive in matter anti matter as my beloved American History mentor often spoke of using nuclear bombs to dig canals a thousand miles for shipping.
The newly created capability to destroy Russian silo-based nuclear forces with 100-kt W76-1/Mk4A warheads—the most numerous in the US stockpile—vastly expands the nuclear warfighting capabilities of US nuclear forces. Since only part of the W76 force would be needed to eliminate Russia’s silo-based ICBMs, the United States will be left with an enormous number of higher-yield warheads that would then be available to be reprogrammed for other missions.
Approximately 890 warheads are deployed on US ballistic missile submarines (506 W76-1/Mk4A and 384 W88/Mk5). Assuming that the 506 deployed W76-1s equipped with the super-fuze were used against Russian silo-based ICBMs, essentially all 136 Russian silo-based ICBMs could be potentially eliminated by attacking each silo with two W76-1 warheads—a total of 272 warheads. This would consume only 54 percent of the deployed W76-1 warheads, leaving roughly 234 of the 500 warheads free to be targeted on yet other installations. And hundreds of additional submarine warheads are in storage for increasing the missile warhead loading if so ordered. The Trident II missiles that are deployed today carry an average of four to five W76-1 warheads each. However, each missile could carry eight such warheads if the US were to suddenly decide to carry a maximum load of W76 warheads on its deployed Trident II ballistic missiles. And the missile was tested with up to 12 warheads.
Essentially all the 384 W88 “heavy” Trident II warheads, with yields of 455 kt, would also be available for use against deeply-buried targets. In addition, about 400 Minuteman III warheads, with yields of about 300 kt, could be used to target hardened Russian targets. In all, the entire Russian silo-based forces could potentially be destroyed while leaving the US with 79 percent of its ballistic missile warheads unused.
Exactly as in carpet bombing, what once took hundreds of bombs to achieve, now requires one iron bomb. Now one nuclear warhead will do the work of three, and there is not a bunker deep enough for the elite which a salvo could not tunnel a mile into and end that security.
Because of the new kill capabilities of US submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the United States would be able to target huge portions of its nuclear force against non-hardened targets, the destruction of which would be crucial to a "successful" first strike. One such mission would likely involve the destruction of road-mobile ICBMs that had left their garrisons to hide in Russia’s vast forests in anticipation of attack. The garrisons and their support facilities would probably be destroyed quickly, and some of the dispersed road-mobile launchers would also be quickly destroyed as they were in the process of dispersing. To destroy or expose the remaining launchers, United States planners would have the nuclear forces needed to undertake truly scorched-earth tactics: Just 125 US Minuteman III warheads could set fire to some 8,000 square miles of forest area where the road-mobile missiles are most likely to be deployed. This would be the equivalent of a circular area with a diameter of 100 miles.
Such an attack would be potentially aimed at destroying all road-mobile launchers either as they disperse or after they have taken up position some short distance from roads that give them access to forested areas.
Many of the nearly 300 remaining deployed W76 warheads could be used to attack all command posts associated with Russian ICBMs. A very small number of Russia's major leadership command posts are deeply buried, to protect them from direct destruction by nuclear attack. The US military would likely reserve the highest-yield warheads for those targets
So the Russians do not have early warning from space, meaning their window to retaliate is in minutes. Factor in a reality of Russians sleep, have off days, might be slow, may have doubts, and in that few minutes, even with a fire launch code, a first strike would succeed in the neutralizing the Russian response.
That the Russian early warning system reacted to this innocuous launch unambiguously indicates that the Russian warning system has at least some measures within it to alert Russian forces to events that could indicate an evolving US nuclear preemptive attack.
If the United States were to execute such an attack against Russia, Russia would certainly know that the most dangerous and most quickly arriving nuclear warheads would come from US submarine-launched ballistic missiles on station in the North Atlantic. Given the extremely high lethality of essentially all US submarine-based warheads, a well-coordinated US attack would not need to employ US land-based Minuteman ICBMs if its initial aim was to simply destroy Russia’s silo-based ICBMs before they could be launched.
Such a “warfighting attack” would likely begin with the detonation of a nuclear warhead in front of key early-warning radars. An explosion of a 455 kiloton Trident II warhead at an altitude of 1,300 to 1,400 kilometers would create an area of radar “blackout” that would prevent all Russian radars looking toward the United States and into the northern parts of the North Atlantic from observing US ballistic missiles as they rose over the radar horizon.
US missile launches from the North Atlantic would be coordinated to rise over the radar horizon only after the Russian radars had been blinded. Even if the radars were not rendered ineffective, the Russians could reasonably expect to have no more than seven to 10 minutes of warning before Moscow was destroyed.
3 minutes the Russian Generals concur it is an American first strike, 3 minutes for Mr. Putin to give the launch code, 5 minutes for Russian crews to be surprised, fumble and delay and that is 11 minutes instead of 10 which was required.
This is the type of conversation which Donald Trump has been briefed on as much as Mike Pence, so they all nod their heads and agree that Dr. Strangepud can win a nuclear war.
The President now has increased the effectiveness of the US arsenal by 3 fold. This increases a Eurasian response of guerilla tactical nuclear warfare in pre positioned weapons and increasing the toxicity payload.
Oh and the above super fuses are not the thinking warheads, that is another article which may appear when the scientists are moved to divulge more information.