As another Lame Cherry exclusive in matter anti matter.
There was an interesting article in examining the historical use of machine guns in the German Army in World War II. The Germans used tactics completely opposite of the Americans, British and Russians, in the use of heavy machine guns.
Unlike their American, British, Commonwealth, and Soviet adversaries, the Germans in World War II employed machine guns as their major infantry support weapons. The Allies used automatic weapons to support rifle-armed infantry. The German Army reversed the process, using infantry to support machine guns in combat.
The MG 42 units within the unit were the heavy armor of battle, the English long bow or the heavy cavalry. While not a match for Soviet tanks, and being out gunned, the German Landser played a cat and mouse game with the communist tanks, in using demolition packs, as they were not provided heavy tank weapons.
Germans simply vanished in trenches with their guns.
German machine gun doctrine, both for defense and attack, stressed five basic points: surprise, fire and movement, coordination of firepower, conservation of ammunition, and alternate positions. In defense, the MG 42 was usually employed with its tripod to act as a heavy machine gun. When German troops were surprised by an enemy attack, the weapon was often removed from the tripod and used as a light machine gun to counterattack the enemy assault. Acting as a heavy automatic weapon, the MG 42 was usually sited in concealed ground and manned by two gunners under the direction of a section leader. Reverse slopes were the preferred covered positions. The guns were only placed in their final fire position at the last moment before combat began.
The German strategy was actually brilliant, as it provided heavy massed firepower which was quick and mobile. Against infantry, it was overpowering and when coupled with German artillery, it was invincible.
the German rifleman’s prime responsibility was to support the squad-operated machine gun. When the MG 42 crew moved, the riflemen covered them with fire. When the MG 42 set up, the riflemen dug foxholes for the machine gun crew while watching for the approach of enemy forces. When the MG 42 opened fire, several riflemen were detailed to carry ammunition to the gun. Since the MG 42 was light enough to be operated and carried by one man, the bearer could keep pace with advancing comrades.
It was the German order of battle, or ordering the battlefield which brought their success. The attack was not just planned, it was planned to be mobile, in advance and to absorb thee attack. The machine gun unit was designed to neutralize an enemy advance, shift to assist strong enemy advances against the German lines, and in necessity, to fall back and set an ambush as the advance exposed themselves.
All contingencies were provided for. A Landser did not have to think out their actions as the enemy would always either attack, be shifting to a weak spot or breaking through a line. In each scenario, all the German had to do was set up and fire.
Consider this Tri Plan strategy. When the German lines absorbed the initial attack and killed 1/3rd of the enemy, the enemy would shift, the Germans would be ready at the salient and kill 1/3rd more. In the event of being driven back, the German Landser would then kill advancing 1/3rd. In this order of battle, the attack force would number zero. That is why the Germans had such great success.
On the defensive, MG 42s were shifted back and forth between different positions to confuse the enemy. The Germans called this tactic Stelungswechsel (change of position) and was a vital part of their overall machine gun doctrine. Three firing pits for the gun were usually dug at various places along the front line: one to cover the expected avenue of an enemy advance; another on the left or right flank to support a neighboring squad; and yet another—called the Schweige MG (ambush position)—about 50 yards behind the main German line. These tactics made the Germans, as one American officer during the early stages of the Normandy Campaign stated, “masters at making one man appear to be a whole squad by moving rapidly from one concealed position to another.”
agtG
