Saturday, March 5, 2016


As another Lame Cherry exclusive in matter anti matter.

So much has been focused on the Kennedy assassination, that the intrigue is not relished for what it is, in how the Kennedy's operated. The following are the statements in official investigatory files on the operations to assassinate Fidel Castro.

What they reveal is that there was a Phase I, Phase II and after Kennedy was murdered a Phase III. It originated first apparently from the Kennedy's, as in Jack and Bobby, discussed the Castro situation, and in addition to the Bay of Pigs, an "Executive Action" AKA assassination command was being formulated, directly from the Kennedys, not only on Castro, but Castro was unique in it moved through channels of plausible deniability.

It was difficult for the denials, as a Special Group which included State, Defense, CIA and select intelligence officers, became involved in this operation.

It is interesting that this Special Group sounds like the grandfather of the Vice President George HW Bush, Sub Operational Groups, which have been engaged in all sorts of notorious activities directed against Americans.

What is of interest in this, is Richard Helms and General Edward Lansdale were primarily responsible for this operational stance going on in the White House, and the person in control of all the dirty work was Attorney General Robert Kennedy. It was though Director of Plans in Richard Bissell who first formulated the policy, and in this deniability, it appears that Bobby Kennedy was the catalyst. Whether RFK had a bug put into his ear or it was his or JFK's original idea, nothing is hinted at in these quotes, but what started as a presidential question, soon had the entire White House involved in discussing murder plots.

The assessment came down to, John Kennedy speaking to intelligence planning, about "what if", and making it plain that the what if, is what was the outcome which was expected, and then simply expecting the results.

After all of this, President Gerald Ford in 1975 forbid all assassination policy for America, and by 2009, Barack Hussein Obama had gone wholesale in the drone assassination business.

The quotes provide a most interesting view of how the Kennedy White House was operating, and how some of the most gifted minds were dealing with the situation and the fall out.

Bissell stated that he had "no clear recollection of any 
discussion with anyone in the Eisenhower Administration concerning 
any possible plan to assassinate Castro. " but there could have been. 
He said that if it would have occurred at all during the Eisenhower 
Administration, "it would have been with Gordon Gray. " 

Bissell testified that although "my recollection of this is far from clear. . .
 I am satisfied that very early in 
the Kennedy Administration I did participate" in conversations with 
someone in the White House concerning the planning of what was called 
an executive action capability, which was defined in substance as a 
capability of the Agency to carry out assassinations, if required. 

When asked with whom these conversations occurred, Bissell said "I 
am almost certain it was either Walt Rostow (Deputy Assistant to the 
President for National Security) or McGeorge Bundy (Presidential 
Assistant for National Security), or probably- the former, and possibly 
both. "


There was direct access of the Director of 
Central Intelligence to the President, according to Mr, Bundy, He 
said that based upon his experience, "I would not have expected, , .the 
Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of 
a foreign leader without direct order from higher authority". . , it 
did not happen in the time I was there, , . but I can conceive of the 
President saying to somebody, I do not want to make this decision 
but giving some indication of the kind of decision he wanted made. " 


The Interrogation of the Phase I Case Officer 
The case officer stated that he had been told that the 
project had been approved by Allen Dulles, Director of Central 
Intelligence, but he (the case officer) had no knowledge of whether or 
not there had been any discussion or approval from the White House.


There was direct access of the Director of 
Central Intelligence to the President, according to Mr, Bundy, He 
said that based upon his experience, "I would not have expected, , .the 
Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of 
a foreign leader without direct order from higher authority". . , it 
did not happen in the time I was there, , . but I can conceive of the 
President saying to somebody, I do not want to make this decision 
but giving some indication of the kind of decision he wanted made. " 

In late 1961 or early 1962, Deputy Director for 
Plans, Richard Bissell, recalled asking a new case officer 
"to take over a part of our reviving effort against Castro 
and the Castro Administration. . .1 probably urged him to 
look into this plan... which had been the subject of active 
attention nearly a year before. I have no recollection of 
authorizing him to revive it, except to look at it as a 
plan, or to proceed with any action along those lines." 
Richard Bissell resigned from the Agency in February, 1962. 
His successor as Deputy Director for Plans was Richard Helms. 

b. The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer • 
(1) Developing an "Executive Action" capability . 
The Phase II case officer in a signed recorded 
interview said that he had a conversation with Richard Bissell, 
which he believed took place in the latter part of 1961 or 
early 1962, in which Bissell told him in substance that someone 
in the White House had raised the question whether or not the 
Agency should develop what was called an "executive action 
capability," which was a capability of assassination or 
liquidation of leaders of foreign countries. The case 
officer said that Bissell briefed him that an operation 
against Castro "had been mounted " and "that it had been 
handled through Sheffield Edwards." 
The Phase II case officer stated in his 2 recorded interview 
that after he was briefed by the previous  
case officer and discussed the matter with Sheffield Edwards,  
he then discussed the matter with Richard Helms. The Phase II  
case officer took over the direct contact with the Mafia personnel 
which to the best of his recollection occurred "about early 
April 1962." 


The Phase II case officer stated that sometime 
prior to August 1962, he had a conversation with Richard Helms,  
who had succeeded Richard Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans. 
The case officer said that the question was raised whether
or not the new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, 
should be briefed of the operation. "I did recommend to Mr. 
Helms that since this 'operation' and the possible repercussions 
from it all stemmed from actions which had taken place long 
before either Helms or myself had had any personal connection 
with it, and before John McCone had had any connection whatever 
with the Agency, and since the decision had been made at that 
time that this should be sanitized, tied off and terminated 
as soon as practically feasible, I saw no reason why the new 
DCI should be briefed on it,- and I strongly recommended that 
he not be . "

The Special Group (Augmented) was a group of senior 
people in the Administration who were involved in overall 
planning with operations directed against Cuba. Included in 
that group were the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; the Secretary 
of Defense, Robert McNamara; the Attorney General of the 
United States, Robert Kennedy; the Assistant to the President 
for National Security, McGeorge Bundy; General Maxwell 
Taylor; and General Lyman Lemn ctzer (who is a member of the 
Commission) , along with sever:, i others. The coordinating 
officer of the Special Group (Augmented) was Brigadier General 
Edward Lansdale. (Robert Kennedy was not present at the 
August 10, 1962, meeting.) 

The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer 
The Phase II case officer said that he was at 
a meeting of the "Special Group (Augmented) in the State 
Department in August 1962, when someone brought up the 
possibility of "liquidation" of Castro. John McCone was at 
that meeting and, according to the case officer, John McCone 
"got rather red in the face" and made a remark which "was a 
clear effort to stop any such proposals, suggestion or any 
discussion thereof at that meeting within that forum 
immediately. "

On August 14, 1962, the Phase II case officer 
prepared a memorandum for the Deputy Director of Plans, who 
was Richard Helms, in which he attached a copy of an August 13, 
1962 memorandum prepared by General Lansdale. The CIA case 
officer's memorandum to Helms said: 

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your 
information • 

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 
1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from 
General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this- memorandum, 
excised from which are four words in the second line 
of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four . 
words were "including liquidation of leaders." 

The question of assassination, particularly of 
Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at 
the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary 
Rusk's office on 10 August.

In 1961 Lansdale was appointed by Secretary 
McNamara as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special 

(a) Discussions with and Written Proposals to 
President Kennedy 

Lansdale said that he had a discussion 
with President Kennedy, "I 'do not recall exactly on that. He 
asked me if I would think about the situation in Cuba and 
if I could come up with any suggestions or recommendations 
from such a study. It was a rather vague assignment by him, o 
but it was to Be acne for him" I 
Lansdale "suggested an intermediary" to 
whom he would report and Lansdale said the President "appointed 
his brother, who was the Attorney General." 

According to Lansdale, he made an initial 

series of recommendations in late 1961 or early 1962, in o 
writing, addressed to the President, "to see if there was a 
possibility of using Cuban refugees to help them get their § 
political thinking together to see if there would be any £ 
f-iMUt, of . — o„ in c*... He says h e ^ S he S 
gave the written report to the Attorney General for delivery 
to the President and that he later saw the paper "in the files 
of the President. . .he received it and he had possession of it." 

Lansdale said that if there were directions 
to submit papers , it was an authorization for submitting papers 
and not an authorization for necessarily carrying out the g 
action. Lansdale admitted that "there might well have been"  
a request for the CIA to come up with, as a possibility, a 
plan for liquidation of leadership.  

If that request was made, he said it could  
have been one of his requests and that he "quite probably 
would have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense" and 
"possibly the Attorney General with whom I was in contact."


Lansdale said that at no time during 1960, 
1961, 1962 or 1963 did he have any knowledge of the existence 
of any plans for the assassination of any Cuban leader or 
any other leader. 

Lansdale testified that he never heard any 
discussion of "executive action capability."

Richard Helms, now .ambassador to Iran, 
testified that "there was a flat-out effort ordered by the 
White House, the President,. Bobby Kennedy who was after 
all his man, his right hand in these matters, to unseat the 
Castro government, to do everything possible to get rid of 
it by whatever device could be found and that was the reason 
for mounting this large operation in Miami to work on this 
very problem. And the Bay of Pigs was a part of this effort 
and after the Bay of Pigs failed, there was even a greater 
push to try to get rid of this Communist influence 90 miles 
from the United States shores. 

In response to a question concerning "Who 
might have been the driving forces from the White House in 
efforts to do something about Castro" Helms responded, "Well 
the principal driving force was the Attorney General, Robert 
Kennedy, There isn't any question about this. Involved in 
this was a group of individuals who were sort of hired and 
pulled together by Kennedy and Rusk and McNamara and McGeorg 
Bundy and all those people to get on with this job and as I 
sit here and start to hink about this, Calif ano was one of them.. 
It seems to me Lansdale, who had been successful in this kind 
of operation out in the Par East was brought in for a while." 

(2)- Possible Assassination Plans 

Ambassador Helms testified that he did not 
recall "any plans that were approved or that were viable
specifically directed at eliminating Castro, but that there 
were conversations about it, I haven't the slightest doubt."

Ambassador Helms said he did not "recall ever* 
having heard anything about poison pills or any of that." 
He did recall that "at some juncture" a decision was reached 
"that it would be advisable to brief Robert Kennedy as the 
Attorney General " about "various things that the Agency had 
had to do" with certain Mafia members. He did recall that 
the Phase II case officer had taken over the plans but 
he did not "recall any special basis being used to try to 
get them to do an assassination." 

President Ford has firmly announced that assassina- 
tion is not and should never Be a tool of United States 
policy. The Executive Director of the Commission joins in 
this statement. It is against the constitutional and moral 
principles for which this Republic stands for there to be any 
direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United 
States Government in any plans involving the assassination 
of any person in peacetime.