Lame Cherry: A Matter of Two American Civil Wars

Lincoln's War

As another Lame Cherry exclusive in matter anti matter.

It is a pity that it not common understanding why General Robert E. Lee went to Antietam or Sharpesburg and followed it up with Gettysburg, because it was a sound military doctrine in reality, which lost the war. This is not to discredit General Lee, but to educate the public as to the complexities of the politics in the North and the South, and to understand the military doctrine behind it.

In essence, General Lee invaded the North, because he desired a quick end to the war, to force Abraham Lincoln to the peace table or have the Northern Citizen remove this despot by the ballot box. Maryland was the chosen field because Maryland was occupied by federal troops and being held hostage against her will. The People of Maryland were naturally allied to the protections of the Confederate Army as they were being burned out and exiled by Lincoln's Army.

Antietam or Sharpesburg ended in failure, because as General Longstreet stated, the South had just whipped McClellan at Bull Run II, and had the field. The Confederate Soldier needed to rest and the Army of Northern Virginia, had only to meander through Maryland, regain strength, and then choose the next battle on her terms.

Instead when General Lee inquired about the operation to General Longstreet, he stated it was not a good idea, and the next situation Longstreet encountered was Lee and General Jackson huddled together looking for a fight.

I will not go into details of the mistakes of that fight, and how it was a shallow 'victory' for the North for Lincoln to claim his Emancipation Proclamation, because this is about the quick victory which Lee was looking for, and the hope that it would gain recognition to the South by Britain and France, and in alliance, bring an invasion from Canada or Mexico by the British or French to defeat Abraham Lincoln.

As all understand the basics of the war in how it was lost by the will of God for a United States, it is important to know that there was an alternative plan to General Lee's by General Longstreet which was the correct tactical and strategic policy for the Confederate States. The way to beat Lincoln was not in the east, but in the west, by smashing the weakest link in Tennessee in General Rosecrans, by sending part of Lee's army to Tennessee and whip Rosecrans before the federals knew of the operation.
Longstreet's division was to link with General Johnston in this operation, by leaving General Grant in the rear, Rosecrans smashed, and Grant and Sherman drawn from Vicksburg to have to try and save Ohio and the Union from being split.

Review this now in McClellan's Army of the Potomac was off balance in defeat. McClellan had to defend Washington City against Lee. That would leave Grant and Sherman to face without supply, Johnston and Longstreet in Tennessee and Ohio, where they would choose the battle and in so doing crush the western army of the Union.

Lincoln's Response to Individual Rights

Observe the battlefield in your mind. The South undivided. The Union divided in Ohio. The West cut off from the East. The armies of Johnston, Longstreet and Bragg, threatening Pennsylvania and West Virginia, and in pincer movement annexing Maryland at Harper's Ferry.
General Lee in the South, holding McClellan or whoever was Lincoln's new general by the nose as the western Confederate Army began flanking. The entire bounty of riches available in New Jersey and New York to succor this army now occupying the North, while Mr. Lincoln ruled from the suburb of Washington City.

After reporting to General Lee, I offered the sugges-
tions made to Secretary Seddon, in regard to the means
that should be adopted for the relief of Vicksburg. I
thought that honor, interest, duty, and humanity called
us to that service, and asked the aid of his counsels with
the War Department, and reinforcements from his army
for the West, to that end. I suggested that General
Johnston, instead of trying to collect an army against
General Grant, should be sent to reinforce General Bragg,
then standing against the Union forces under General
Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee ; that at the same time he
should send my divisions, just up from Suffolk, to join
Johnston's reinforcements to Bragg's army ; that the
combination once made should strike immediately in over-
whelming force upon Rosecrans, and march for the Ohio
River and Cincinnati.

He recognized the suggestion as of good combina-
tion, and giving strong assurance of success, but he was
averse to having a part of his army so far beyond his
reach. He reflected over the matter one or two days, and
then fell upon the plan of invading the Northern soil, and
so threatening Washington as to bring about the same
hoped-for result. To that end he bent his energies.

His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and
improper to offer suggestions leading to a different course.
All that I could ask was that the policy of the campaign
should be one of defensive tactics ; that we should work
so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position
as we might find in his own country, so well adapted to
that purpose, — which might assure us of a grand triumph.
To this he readily assented as an important and material
adjunct to his general plan. His confidence in making
moves threatening Washington and the invasion of Mary-
land and Pennsylvania grew out of the known anxiety
of the Washington authorities as to the safety of their
capital and of quiet within the Union lines.

None of this would come to be, as General Lee chose an alternative gambit, but what is noted most about General Longstreet in his contact with superiors, political and military, he never was a leader who rammed his head against any wall. He gave his sound judgment, and was wise enough to understand that you simply can not change any leader's mind in their prejudice, as it is waste of time and energy. The best Longstreet could do was agree to the coming fight, but stipulate that it adhere to the terms that it would be fought on the Confederate Army's terms.

That assurance was not kept, as Gettysburg violated every military protocol for battle and that is why the South was defeated there.

It was a matter of two Civil Wars, political and military, and of two leaders North and South, with divergent battle plans. The two in the South were at odds in east and west. The east campaign was decided upon and by it the war was lost, not because the plan was bad, but because the South never held the correct ground for battle in the major battles at Sharpesburg and Gettysburg.