As another Lame Cherry exclusive in matter anti matter.
The germination of the defeat at Gettysburg for the Confederates began with the death of General Stonewall Jackson. It had though absolutely nothing to do with General Jackson not being on the field, but instead had to do with two deliberate failures in leadership by General Robert E. Lee concerning the Army of Northern Virginia.
General Lee's mistake was that he was prejudiced in the extreme for his country. His country being Virginia and that meant all Virginians. When Stonewall Jackson was killed, there were several other superior ranked generals and generals of ability who should have been appointed to the Second Corp to replace Jackson. The top and correct choice should have been General DH Hill, who was second to none in the Union Army, and had only one general of equal ability in General James Longstreet, the American Napoleon. In that though, General Hill as Field General even surpassed General Longstreet in performance.
Time and again, General Hill fought, to even on the line in Antietam with his men. He was an incredible leader, soldier, tactician and fighter who never lost.
Into this as another superior general was General Richard Ewell. General Ewell was as solid and tested on the battlefield as any.
General Lee though instead chose a Virginian of low ability and less accomplishment in General Jubal Early. In most cases if there was a way to be in the rear and shoot your own Confederates in front, or lose a position to the Union, Jubal Early would complete the task for Abraham Lincoln. Early would after the war create the racist fiction of the Lost Cause, excusing his failures, the Confederate political and military failures, excuse Yankee brutality of the South, because the South had lost already before the war began.
Early would smear General Longstreet as the reason the Confederates lost the war, when in fact as the events detail, Jubal Early was the main reason that the Confederates lost at Gettysburg.
General Lee appointed Early though to the Second Corp and this is where events begin the problems of Gettysburg as there were three days of battle, in Day 1, Day 2 and Day 3.
Most readers will be ignorant of the fact that on Day 1 the Confederates won handily, in what was a minor route where General Ewell drove the Union lines off the left extreme, out of Gettysburg and into the surrounding countryside.
Day One Gettysburg
"Day One" though was a disaster for the South and the Army of Northern Virginia, because what Second Corp accomplished was driving the Union from untenable positions, and into their lines, and the premier spot of the battlefield on the left in Culp's Hill.
This is what General Longstreet remarked from his First Corp position, in all General Ewell had accomplished was to drive the Union into stronger position of the high ground.
There was a man on the left of the line who did not care to make the battle win. He knew where it was, had viewed it from its earliest formation, had orders for his part in it, but so withheld part of his command from it as to make co-operative concert of action impracticable. He had a pruriency for the honors of the field of Mars, was eloquent, before the fires of the bivouac and his chief, of the glory of war's gory shield ; but when its envied laurels were dipping to the grasp, when the heavy field called for bloody work, he found the placid horizon, far and away beyond the cavalry, more lovely and inviting. He wanted command of the Second Corps, and, succeeding to it, held the honored position until General Lee found, at last, that he must dismiss him from field service.
In this time, General Lee surveyed the field in person, and noted to General Jubal Early that if advisable, Early should in the night, take Culp's Hill as it was an important position on the field. Early instead did not move throughout the entire night, by which time the Union lines had constructed works and reinforced their position.
Culp's Hill should have been seized by General Early before General Ewell began his engagement, as preparation for the coming battle at Gettysburg. Instead Culp's Hill became a fortified position that it would have taken vast resources as in the entire Second Corp to take that position, and wasted a Corp against a Union Brigade.
When I left General Lee, about seven o'clock in the evening, he had formed no plans beyond that of seizing Gulp's Hill as his point from which to engage, nor given any orders for the next day, though his desperate mood was painfully evident, and gave rise to serious apprehen- sions. He had heard nothing of the movements of the enemy since his crossing the Potomac, except the report of the scout. His own force on the field was the Second Corps, Eodes's, Early's, and E. Johnson's divisions from right to left through the streets of Gettysburg around towards Gulp's Hill
Culp's Hill bore the same re- lations to the enemy's right as Little Round Top did to his left. General Fitzliugh Lee quotes evidence from General Meade that had Gulp's Hill been occupied, in force, by Confederates, it would have compelled the with- drawal of the Federal troops.
This was the key to the field, not the Ken Burns or other Ted Turner focus upon General Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain on Little Round Top, and equally important feature on the field to enfilade the Union lines, but as will be seen, if General Longstreet would have been supported as General Lee Promised, Longstreet could have encompassed Little Round Top and negated it as a Union position of strength and made it one of weakness.
During the night, General Meade held a council, which decided to fight it out. So it began to look as if the vicis- situdes of the day had so worked as to call General Meade from defensive to aggressive battle for Gulp's Hill. But the Gonfederates failed to see the opportunity and force the issue as it was presented.
Day Two Gettysburg
Day Two of the battle began with the stars shining brightly, with Longstreets' remaining divisions having marched all night and began to arrive at dawn. General Lee had no orders to give, and this refutes the claim of General Pendleton that Lee had ordered an early morning attack by General Longstreet.
It was a situation where General Longstreet's not rested troops should have never been ordered to battle on that day.
The stars were shining brightly on the morning of the 2d when I reported at General Lee's head-quarters and asked for orders. After a time Generals McLaws and Hood, with their staffs, rode up, and at sunrise their com- mands filed off the road to the right and rested. The Washington Artillery was with them, and about nine o'clock, after an all-night march, Alexander's batteries were up as far as Willoughby's Run, where he parked and fed, and rode to head-quarters to report. As indicated by these movements. General Lee was not ready with his plans. He had not heard from his cavalry, nor of the movements of the enemy further than the information from a despatch captured during the night, that the Fifth Corps was in camp about five miles from Gettysburg, and the Twelfth Corps was reported near Gulp's Hill. As soon as it was light enough to see, how- ever, the enemy was found in position on his formidable heights awaiting us.
The events of Day One had moved the Union commanders to decide to fight it out at Gettysburg. During the night the Union wasted no time and gained the heights above the Confederates, commanding the entire battlefield.
It was then during the day on Day Two that General Lee made the decision for an corresponding engagement of all corps, but the main battle would be First Corp of General Longstreet. In what was the coming zephyr of disaster, as General Longstreet was ordered to attack, General Meade in command of the Union forces was conferring with General Sickles, and messaged General Halleck in Washington City, about still withdrawing his forces, if the Confederates were moving to cut off his communications and lines with Washington City, which the Confederates were. Meade had made the decision to withdraw, but Longstreet promptly was following Lee's orders for a later afternoon attack. If the attack had come 40 minutes later, the Union lines would have begun withdrawing and Little Round Top would have been taken by encirclement as other Confederate forces joined Longstreet.
At the opening of the fight, General Meade was with General Sickles discussing the feasibility of moving the Third Corps back to the line originally assigned for it, but the discussion was cut short by the opening of the Confederate battle. If that opening had been delayed thirty or forty minutes the corps would have been drawn back to the general line, and my first deployment would have enveloped Little Kound Top and carried it before it could have been strongly manned, and General Meade would have drawn off to his line selected behind Pipe Creek. The point should have been that the battle was opened too soon.
What then took place was not a general engagement, but a lighting of the fuse in General Lee for a blood letting like few others in the Civil War. What Day Two accomplished was to set the Union lines in strength, even more so than Day One and taught the Union and the Confederates that the battle could be won by the Union and lost by the Confederates, if repeated.
Thus the general engagement of the day was dwarfed into the battle of the right at three o'clock, that on the left at eight by a single division, and that nearer the centre at nine o'clock by two brigades.
There was a volcanic fury building inside Robert E. Lee, and Day One ignited it, Day Two whetted it, and Day Three would destroy the Confederacy, as General Lee violated his battle plan in engaging the enemy.
Day Three GettysburgThat he was excited and off his balance was evident on the afternoon of the 1st, and he hxbored under that op- pression until enough blood was shed to appease him.
Day Three at Gettysburg was a day in which General Lee offered up to the Union the slaughter of the First Corp of the Army of Northern Virginia. It is vital to understand this, because only First Corp engaged in combat on that day. Second Corp of Jubal Early did not assist, and Third Corp where General Lee was observing offered absolutely no support. It was a reality of 13,000 of First Corp decimated from the previous day, having to rest from the Day One march, was ordered to attack fortified Union lines of an Army of the Potomac of 70,000, with superior artillery and position.
General Longstreet challenged General Lee on every point. 30,000 men were the minimum force necessary with close cooperation with the two other Corps. There was a thousand yard march under long range musketry before the Confederates could reach the Union fortifications.
In a bizarre exchange General Longstreet challenged the march was a mile under cannon fire and musket, but Lee countered that it was only fourteen hundred yards. That would still be 1400 yards too long for infantry attacking such fortified placements.
It was then that General Lee informed General Longstreet that General Pickett's brigades would assist with elements of Third Corp. When Longstreet inquired as to the strength, he was told it was 15,000 Soldiers.
General Longstreet then replied," That the 15,000 men who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle."
General Lee though was impatient with listening and General Ewell's batteries opened up from Second Corp.
It then fell to Colonel Walton of the Washington artillery to begin work on Longstreet's part of the field, The problem being part of his force had been ordered off, and the artillery was low on ammunition. The Union had superior range and artillery, but the Washington artillery was not at strength enough to deal with the Union lines.
The orders were for Colonel Walton to notify General Longstreet when there was slackening in the Union artillery. This never took place and in a desperate note to carry out General Lee's orders, Colonel Alexander director of artillery sent this message.
"If you are coming at all, come at once, or I cannot give you proper support, but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all. At least 18 guns are still firing from the cemetery itself.
- Alexander.
General Longstreet handed the note to General Pickett who asked if he should advance. Longstreet would not voice the order, but only nodded to it. This began the slaughter which went down in history.
d
Single files were cut here and there, then the gaps increased, and an occasional shot tore wider openings, but, closing the gaps as quickly as made, the march moved on.Colonel Latrobe was sent to General Trimble to have his men fill the line of the broken brigades, and bravely they repaired the damage. The enemy moved out against the supporting brigade in Pickett's rear. Colonel Sorrel was sent to have that move guarded, and Pickett was drawn back to that contention. McLaws was ordered to press his left forward, but the direct fire of infantry and cross-fire of artillery was telling fearfully on the front. Colonel Fremantle ran up to offer congratulations on the apparent success, but the big gaps in the ranks grew until the lines were reduced to half their length. I called his attention to the broken, struggling ranks. Trimble mended the battle of the left in handsome style, but on the right the massing of the enemy grew stronger and stronger. Brigadier Garnett was killed, Kemper and Trimble were desperately wounded ; Generals Hancock and Gibbon were wounded. General Lane succeeded Trimble, and with Pettigrew held the battle of the left in steady ranks. Pickett's lines being nearer, the impact was heaviest upon them. Most of the field officers were killed or wounded.
In a testament to the Confederates, there was no rout, there was no panic. There was the organized withdrawal from this slaughter field.
The bravery shown by enlisted and officers was of the noblest of any army. Staff officers of Longstreet were sent forward with orders, to return with their saddles and bridles in their hands.
General Pickett, finding the battle broken, while the enemy was still reinforcing, called the troops off. There was no indication of panic. The broken files marched back in steady step. The effort was nobly made, and failed from blows that could not be fended. Some of the files were cut off from retreat by fire that swept the field in their rear. Ofiicers of my staff, sent forward with orders, came back with their saddles and bridles in their arms. Latrobe's horse was twice shot.
General Longstreet expected an immediate counter attack and rode forward with the shells over him. He was confident his men would rally once they reached their lines to receive the Union charge. The Union sent out skirmishers but was driven back by Confederate artillery. It was then that General Lee and his staff first appeared on the field, encouraging the troops.
Looking confidently for advance of the enemy through our open field, I rode to the line of batteries, resolved to hold it until the last gun was lost. As I rode, the shells screaming over my head and ploughing the ground under my horse, an involuntary appeal went up that one of them might take me from scenes of such awful responsibility ; but the storm to be met left no time to think of one's self. The battery officers were prepared to meet the crisis, — no move had been made for leaving the field. My old acquaintance of Sharpsburg experience. Captain Miller, was walking up and down behind his guns, smoking his pipe, directing his fire over the heads of our men as fast as they were inside of the danger-line ; the other officers equally firm and ready to defend to the last. A body of skirmishers put out from the enemy's lines and advanced some distance, but the batteries opened severe fire and drove it back. Our men passed the batteries in quiet walk, and would rally, I knew, when they reached the ridge from which they started. General Lee was soon with us, and with staff-officers and others assisted in encouraging the men and getting them together.
Save for the Cavalry clash beyond the front, the three days of Gettysburg battle were finished on July 3rd, when retreat was made by General Lee.
This is what Gettysburg really was. It was not some grande battle, but a Southern success on Day One which produced stronger Union positions. An attack on Day Two which should not have been made, but delayed as further encirclement and reinforcement took place, as the Union was about to withdraw in fear of having it's supplies cut, was unsupported and against fortifications and heights which could not be overcome. Day Three repeated the mistake of Day Two, in ordering exposed brigades to their massed slaughter on open field against fixed positions.
There has never been an army which could carry against those odds and with such suicidal leadership as General Lee produced.
Allow your enemy to command the heights, fortify their lines, provide not for artillery cover, send massed brigades on the open field, and Gettysburg will occur every time.
The Confederates lost many men after the battle, and before they recrossed the Potomac, from the toils of the march and the continuous and severe harassment of the enemy's cavalry, which followed closely and in great force. The casualties were : CONFEDERATE. First Corps 7,539 Second Corps 5,937 Third Corps 6,735 Cavalry 1,426 Aggregate 21,637
God rest their souls.
agtG
